

ASSESSING NIGERIA'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS)



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ABSTRACT

The socio-economic and political contributions of Nigeria in ECOWAS has enormous relevance in the areas of regional trade and democratic dispensation. Over the years, Nigeria has demonstrated its hegemony in the peacekeeping and economic stability in West Africa through ECOWAS. Yet ECOWAS is facing a myriad of security and economic issues that threaten to shake the region's relative stability and economic progress. The challenges range from terrorism and violent extremism, to piracy, political instability, elections-related violence, drug trafficking or deadly health issues. The study adopted focus group discussion with members of the ministry of foreign affairs and embassy staff as the basic method used in data collection. The study used purposive sampling technique to select research participants in equal representation of male and female, amount the staff form the focus group discussion. This revealed that in order to Nigerian approach on socio political economic development contribute to West African state, Nigeria as a hegemon in ECOWAS has played the role of regional stabilizer based on its leadership ability in enforcing ECOWAS programs and policies while remains state or Nations is a shining light in ECOWAS due to its steady democratic process which started from 1966 election, Nigerian government contribution to the development African state particularly emphasized of west Africa through economic community of west African state, ECOWAS. In the area of economic, security, politics and training retraining for the development of West African state. The paper recommended that Nigerian government should formulate a foreign policy that enhances the both human and food

security measures to recover economic development to ECOWAS member states to establish modern agricultural programmes such as the irrigation farming.

Keywords: *Socio-economic, Political, Development and Hegemony.*

Introduction

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975 with the aim of promoting economic cooperation and political stability between fifteen member countries, which sought to promote an ever-expanding regional integration agenda through a broad variety of strategies, action plans and programmes. In 1999, ECOWAS established the basis for a West African peace and security architecture to address some of the spillovers of war and conflict in the region based on a Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. A Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) formulates democratic requirements or constitutional convergence principles for member states, for example zero tolerance for power obtained by unconstitutional means (Protocol 2001). Nigeria- conveys out their actions within the legal framework of the ECOWAS Reviewed Treaty. which state “Citizens of the community shall have the right of entry, residence and creation and member states undertake to recognize these privileges of Community nations in their regions in accordance with the provisions of the Procedures relating thereto, and the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on International Migration. These countries situation and common understanding is that, free movement within the region has contributed to the reduction in the migrant pressures even beyond ECOWAS borders and that, mobility within the ECOWAS region is also a vital component of regional integration, which is itself a requirement for the West African economy's successful integration into the globalization process. “It should be taken under consideration that countries are always located in a particular geographical region, and they are required to have relations with their neighbors which varies” Pejic (2016) While such initiatives aim at the welfare of citizens of the ECOWAS, people in smaller countries such as Ghana consider this to be a threat to its local businesses Murithi (2008).

Nigerian foreign policy towards ECOWAS is based on Afrocentric foreign policy doctrine with emphasis on the emancipation, development, and unity of Africans both within and outside the continent. It was effective at the regional level which was directed at its West African neighbors because

Nigeria sees the West African region as its natural territory. Nigerian foreign policy towards ECOWAS is defined by the prevailing circumstances in the region that allows the kind of foreign policy which was premeditated to response to the frequent political instabilities across the region because of incessant military coups, religious intolerance, lack of social-economic development, and supremacy struggle between Anglophone and Francophone countries in the region due to their historical experience. Consequently, Nigeria as a member of ECOWAS was governed by military rulers except for the brief period of Shagari civilian rule from 1979 to 1983. Hence, during that era, Nigeria's status as a non-democratic country under military regime dictated its foreign policy directions towards ECOWAS and the West African regional integration process (Bassey 2011).

A key component of Nigeria's foreign policy was to assume political leadership in terms of activating the Protocol of 1999, and footing the bill of peace operations. By the end of the 1990s, however, the country under the democratically elected President Obasanjo sought to offload part of the burden of these peace operations to the continental peace and security architecture in the making⁹. Meanwhile, peace and security has become the core business of ECOWAS, as other member states also share strong incentives to organise themselves to prevent the regionalisation of wars and violent conflicts. Unlike infrastructure development or trade policies, for example, the costs of war and their regional spillovers are immediately visible, and instantly affect public opinion and voting behaviour. Political inaction at national and regional level can result in heavy electoral or other costs (Mevel & Karingi, 2012).

Nigeria as a regional hegemon has economic advantage to grow, but without economic transformation. On the trade front, the country has often adopted inward looking and protectionist stances, which have, until recently, slowed down the market integration and custom union processes of ECOWAS. Nigeria is the largest economy in Africa with a GDP that exceeds all the countries of the ECOWAS region combined, with projected population of 190 million citizens. But there have been inherent economic and political weaknesses. More than half of its period as an independent country (1960) Nigeria has been ruled by the military. There have been frequent eruptions of violence related to ethnic, religious and social fault lines. The Boko Haram insurgency in north eastern Nigeria is in many ways particular, yet, "its origins and potency are profoundly symptomatic of wider failures of the state" (McNamee, 2016)

Statement of the Problem

Some of the major aims of ECOWAS is the recognition, accountability, economic and social justice and popular participation in development; maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness. Yet ECOWAS is facing a myriad of security and economic issues that threaten to shake the region's relative stability and economic progress. The challenges range from terrorism and violent extremism, to piracy, political instability, elections-related violence, drug trafficking or deadly health issues.

There are several studies conducted on Nigeria's approach of socio political economic development of West African state. Nwokoye (2018) focused on economic structure of West Africa. Alli (2019) Nigeria in regional security policy, Omo-ogbebor (2017) studied on Asymmetry of ECOWAS integration process: contribution of regional hegemon and small country and Sahel, (2006). Studied on the socio-economic and regional context of West African migrations?

These studies have not explore extensively on. Nigerian approach to West African states, these stand as the research gap for this study to cover and contribute to the scholarly discourse. It is against this research gap that this study assessed the Nigerian approach to socio political economic development contribute to West African states.

Objective of the Study

The main objective of the study is to reinforce the Nigerian approach to socio political economic development contribute to West African state, the specific objectives are to:

- I. Assess contribute of Political Economic in west Africa
- II. Examine socio political development in west Africa
- III. Assess the Nigerian Approach to west Africa
- IV. Examine the challenges Nigerian to ECOWAS

Literature Review

The Nigerian government doomed Intra-regional trade Approach on Socio Political Economic Development Contribute to West African state is yet another area of interactions between Nigeria and ECOWAS since the commencement of the Fourth Republic. Nigeria has the largest trade volume within the sub-region. Nigeria's major trading product to the international market is crude oil. Yet all the ECOWAS member states dismiss consume up to 10% of total oil production from Nigeria. This has accounted for very

diminutive trade between Nigeria and ECOWAS since 1999. For instance, in 2000, only about 6% of Nigeria's exports mainly oil was traded with ECOWAS members. Most of the oil went to Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. On the other hand, less than 2% imported goods mainly from Benin, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire came from ECOWAS to Nigeria. This has accounted for very little trade between Nigeria and ECOWAS since 1999. However there is a lot of informal trade in entered goods from Benin to Nigeria. In terms of formal trade, smuggled goods such as cars, manufactured goods, machinery, chemicals, beverages, and cornflakes to Benin are thereafter re-exports to Nigeria(Charles 2003).

Contribution of Nigeria to Political Economic in West Africa

The mono cultural political economy of Africa is the immediate cause of conflict in the region. The monophonic- cultural capitalist economic systems in Africa make political conduits necessary to obtain economic advantage. Profit maximization, privatization of means of production and extreme commoditization of labour became the character of African states after decolonization. Successive political leaderships in Africa resorted to rapacious material accumulation and failed to respond to the needs of the people. Most leaders in the region use political status to accumulate wealth by consolidating their position through electoral malpractice and suppression of citizens (Yoroms 2010).

Seat taut syndrome among African leaders becomes general. For instance, Omar Bongo of Gabon died after 42 years in power; Muammar Gaddafi of Libya has stayed 39 years in the Saddle; Teodoro of Equatorial Guinea has held on for 30 years; Hot on his heels is Mugabe at 29 in Zimbabwe, Hosim Mubarak of Egypt stayed over 27 years in power; Paul Biya of Cameroon has been hanging on for 26 years; Yoweri Museveni of Uganda for 23 years; king Mswatiof Burkina Faso for 21 years and host of other. President Olusegun Obasanjo's third term bid in Nigeria was also in this direction. The saddest side of the story is that these rulers have shown lack of ability to blend strength and experience to achieve the much desired development in Africa, yet they remains in political office for self-aggrandizement (Saygili, Peters &KnebeL2018).

Unbearable poverty, deprivation, relegation and political exploitation are prevalent in various parts of the continent despite the specious efforts by African leaders and their exterior supporters to democratize and improve the region. No wonder, most conflict situations in sub-Saharan Africa are related to the struggle for national demand which is usually in protection of natural

resources ranging from Gold to Diamond and Tin to Crude oil. International Colloquium Report (2012) mentioned that: Between 1960 and 1990, no single presiding party in Africa lost power. After 2002, ruling parties were voted out of power in Benin, the Central African Republic, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Zambia. In 2000, the OAU sought to end illegal changes of government. The number of multi-party systems in African countries increased from five in 1989 to 35 in 1998, while the number of one-party states decreased from 29 to two. However, the value of democracy arguably declined between 2005 and 2012, with political rights and civil liberties improving in 15 countries but deteriorating in 18 other states...some African leaders have deployed violence and curtailed rights during election periods in a bid to hold on to power. In 2011, state security forces in the DRC and Uganda used excessive force against opposition party supporters At least 42 people were killed in the DRC in the days before and soon after national polls in 2011 Substantial electoral violence accompanied national polls in Kenya in 2007-2008, Zimbabwe in 2008, and Côte d'Ivoire in 2010-2011. Between 19 and 25 percent of elections in Africa are marred by conflicts Conflict at the polls often relate to issues such as land rights, employment, and marginalization Limão (2008).

Socio-Political Development in West Africa

Provisionally 1999, Nigeria has been actively involved in the promotion of West African sub-regional assistance through the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS). The unending aggressive international system as well as the struggle over infrequent and set possessions required countries to interact in line with their national interests through multilateralism. This freely explains Nigeria's participation in West African sub-regional integration. The success of a sub-regional organization such as ECOWAS also requires the great support from the local sub-regional hegemon, Nigeria, to actualize its aims. This study therefore examines the active nature and changing pattern of interactions between Nigeria and the ECOWAS through the way of Fourth Republic. The treatise also explored some historical backgrounds, which have influenced the intensity, changing pattern as well as Nigeria's commitment towards the ECOWAS (Rosenau, 1990).

Nigeria was very actively involved in the formation of the ECOWAS on 28 May 1975. This was encouraged by certain imperatives that govern the conceptualisation and conduct of the country's foreign policy towards her regional neighbours. These imperatives include; defence and protection of Nigeria's territorial integrity and sovereignty from both internal and external

aggression. In addition, peaceful co-existence and maintenance of good neighborliness and friendship with countries it shares contiguous boundaries be it land, air or waters; and concerns about stability as well as economic integration in the West African sub-region Bassey and Nyonge (2012). These obviously interlocking and coterminous elements, coupled with the ever-growing population of the country, defined the behaviour and realistic analysis of Nigeria's role in the regional integration process in the sub-region.

Equally important was Nigeria's quest for a sub-regional security and stability. The Nigerian Civil War opened the country's leaders to the precariousness and vulnerability of the country to its immediate Francophone countries, which are greatly influenced by France. In the course of the war, Cote d' Ivoire, a Francophone country, recognised the state of Biafra, while Benin Republic and Chad under the influence of France gave secret support to the secessionist Biafra state. Apart from Cote d'Ivoire, the French government assisted the Biafra forces through her former Francophone colonies. Thus, after the war, the Gowon administration, aware of the security threat Nigeria's immediate neighbours posed to the country's existence in addition to France's influence over the countries, initiated a platform that would unite Nigeria and countries in the sub-region, and thereby reduced France influence over its former colonies. Negotiations thereafter culminated in the formation of the ECOWAS in 1975 (Asiwaju 1984).

As previously mentioned, several reasons necessitated Nigeria's commitment to the ECOWAS and its member states. These range from its experience during the civil war (1967-1970) when France used Cote d'Ivoire in an attempt to break Nigeria via provision of support to the Biafra secessionists, economic factor and the desire to increase and enhance its unity. It is truism in International Politics that foreign policy is an extension of domestic politics (Osuntokun 2015). This assertion is true because the impact of domestic politics in the years shortly after 1999 has tremendously influenced the ways and manner Nigeria conducts her external affairs with ECOWAS. The reality is that democratic and civilian regimes are more vulnerable to pressure from public opinion, parliament, and the press.

Hence, unlike the military juntas of Bangagida, Abacha, and Abudsalami when Nigeria bore the burden of ECOWAS particularly with military interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the country's approach toward similar development from 1999 has been markedly different under President Olusegun Obasabjo, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, and Goodluck Ebele Jonathan administrations (Aworawo 2011). Indeed, Nigeria was actively involved in attempt to find lasting solution to the crisis and disagreements that

engulfed Cote d' Ivoire shortly after Gbagbo refused to hand over power to Alassane Ouattara after the latter's electoral victory in November 2011.

The three successive administrations of Obasanjo, Yar'Adua and Jonathan explored the multilateral channel of ECOWAS to help in the resolution of the crisis. Accordingly, Obasanjo worked with his Ghanaian counterpart, President John Kuffor, in reaching a peace agreement that was later abandoned by parties to the conflict. Thus, Nigeria's involvement in the resolution of the Ivorian conflict through ECOWAS was limited to diplomatic approach during Obasanjo era. As a result, when the Sub-regional organization decided to send a one-thousand-five-hundred-strong force to join the French peacekeepers in Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria declined to participate in the operation in January 2003. Consequently, ECOWAS troops came only from Benin, Gambia, Niger, Ghana and Togo. In a related development, Nigeria equally declined to feed her forces in ECOWAS-led military operation in Guinea-Bissau. Instead, the country chose a diplomatic approach. The absence of the regional local hegemon, Nigeria, from ECOMOG forces, which involved the smaller countries was responsible for the premature termination of the operation just after four months (Osuntokun2008).

The approach was very different from the position the Nigerian government took when the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone broke out in the late 1980s and during the 1990 (Sanda 2012). In those instances, Nigeria took the lead and sent by far the largest contingent in addition to bearing more than three-quarters of the cost of the operations (Adebajo2008). The stance maintained by Obasanjo towards the Ivorian crisis was continued under the Umaru Yar'Adua and Goodluck Jonathan administrations from 2007 to 2015. For one thing, Yar'Adua and Jonathan experienced different problems before securing the presidency and they were first preoccupied with establishing their legitimacy and promoting national stability. Yar'Adua had become president after a very controversial election, which many believed was rigged and Jonathan assumed Nigeria's leadership first as Acting President after the sickness and death of Yar'Adua and the controversies it created (Aworawo2011).

In addition to all these, Nigeria has been confronted with varieties of problems of its own, particularly the Boko Haram insurgency which these leaders struggled to solve, with very modest success. Under these circumstances, the logical option by the Nigerian leaders was to follow the approach of minimal involvement in the Ivorian crisis that Obasanjo had adopted. Some analysts of Nigeria's foreign relations have expressed the view that Nigeria's position on, and involvement in the ECOWAS that coupled with

the failure to achieve swift success in Liberia and Sierra Leone had major deficiencies within the military. Against the backdrop of experiences from Liberia and Sierra Leone, Obasanjo refused to commit Nigeria's soldiers. In other words, Nigeria had become peace-keeping-wearied and the policy adopted by the government was in line with popular feelings and public opinion in Nigeria (Radelet, 2010).

Some others have contended that the Nigerian government carefully considered all the issues and the complexities of the Ivorian crisis and concluded that military intervention would not be the right option. The Nigerian authorities reckoned that apart from the huge financial and human costs, which the country could not afford at the time, military intervention would have been interpreted by parties to the conflict to mean support for one group against the other. In addition, considering the large number of Nigerians in Cote d'Ivoire, intervention would spell disaster, as Nigerians in the country would surely be targeted for attack by one or more of the rebel groups (Olayiwola, Osabuohien, Okodua and Ola-David 2015).

The fact that France was already deeply involved in the resolution of the crisis in both military and diplomatic forms, the attitude of Cote d'Ivoire towards Nigeria during the Nigerian Civil War, and the fact that Cote d'Ivoire does not occupy a particularly important strategic calculations, would have been other reasons. Be that as it may, what is beyond dispute is that Nigeria's position on the Ivorian crisis was a reflection of the changing pattern of Nigeria's policy towards West Africa since the early 2000s. Nigeria's response to a similar crisis in Guinea-Bissau in 1999 confirms this (Nwokoye, Uzodigwe, & Nzeribe, 2018).

Different political administrations and leadership in Nigeria have committed to the ECOWAS objectives with varying degrees. One of such leader was General Olusegun Obasanjo, whose tenure as a military of Head of State spanned between 1976 and 1979. In the words of Abutudu, General Olusegun Obasanjo, then Nigerian military head of state, "with pronounced nationalist fervor", threw aside the long-term goals and spirit of sacrifice that the Gowon administration had shown in the integration project and began to press for immediate benefits for Nigeria (Nwachukwu 1991).

First, General Obasanjo raised objections to a situation whereby Nigeria was contributing over 35 percent of the organization's annual budget. The proportion of Nigeria's contribution was thereafter reduced to 25 percent. Moreover, the Obasanjo government emphasized the need for commensurate benefits with the burden borne by Nigeria through its enormous commitment to ECOWAS. Concerning where the sub-regional body's headquarters would be

located, the then Head of State demanded that it should be located in Nigeria, despite earlier agreement between General Gowon and Eyadema for the organization to be located in Togo. For Obasanjo, whatever policy Nigeria is pursuing in ECOWAS and the sub-region must be benefit-driven for the country and its peoples (Jinadu2005). Furthermore, Obasanjo formulated new and more stringent criteria for providing foreign aid to West African countries. The new criteria were as follows: Promotion of national interest, taking into account high and middle level manpower in Nigeria Contributing to national economy and creating productive capacity for Nigeria; and providing relief during disasters and national emergencies in the recipient country (Bolarinwa2005).

In sum, the spirit of sacrifice and selflessness, which characterized Gowon's orientation for the ECOWAS project was completely absent in Obasanjo's military regime. The indifferent posture from the Obasanjo's military regime continued into the President Shehu Shagari civilian administration as well as the General Muhammad Buhari military government. President Shagari embarked on a mass expulsion of a large number of West Africans, described as "illegal aliens", in response to the fundamental structural crisis in which Nigeria was enmeshed by 1983. The anti-regionalism stance was given a military flavour when, in April 1984, Buhari closed all of Nigeria's land borders. The borders remained closed for about two years and the measure was justified in terms of the exercise of changing the national currency, which was an ongoing and anti-smuggling policy, and response to other criminal practices that were sabotaging the Nigerian economy (Dauda 2013).

Nigeria also banned food exports to ECOWAS member states. The impact of this was seriously felt among Nigeria's neighbours to the West such as Benin, Togo, and Ghana. Nigeria's trade relations with these countries were virtually brought to a halt. This situation was further aggravated in May 1985 when the Buhari administration embarked on a mass expulsion of about one million "illegal aliens" mostly of Ghanaian origin. Interestingly, this was done just about two months to the crucial ECOWAS Summit where arrangements for the second stage of the ECOWAS Free Movement policy were to be finalized. The actions of Shagari and Buhari were later re-visited by the Babangida regime on 25th August 1986 and thereafter relapsed (Nwoke, 2005).

However, despite the ambivalence of some Nigerian leaders towards ECOWAS some years back, what is not in question is that ECOWAS provides the Nigerian government the platform to promote the country's socio-cultural,

economic, and political interests. Nigeria's leadership role in the sub-region had enabled ECOWAS to respond effectively to intra-state conflict in West Africa. The formation of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), through the initiative of Nigeria's Head State, General Ibrahim Babangida, in 1990 was instrumental to addressing intra-state conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The same pattern continued under Abacha and Abdul salami administrations, respectively (Murithi, 2008).

Nigerian Approach to West Africa

In 2015, the Nigeria Commission, with financial support from Canada and USAID, launched the support programmer for the free movement of food items Program Food across Borders. The programmer went into operation in ECOWAS Member States with the appointment of focal points and a management team. The September 2016 meeting of its steering committee resulted in the following: Helping to sensitize actors along the regional corridors through roadshows at border posts on the need for the free movement of agricultural produce, TEC, SLE and the protocol on the free movement of goods; the signing of a subsidy agreement with Alliance Borderless in order to promote the free movement of agricultural produce in West Africa and the signing of a subsidy agreement with Non State Actors and the civil society in order to sensitize public actors on adherence to regulatory texts on regional trade in agricultural produce (Saygili Peters & KnebeL2018).

Global economy has been forecast to the Nigerian grow in west Africa at a slower pace of 3.1 percent in 2016 compared to 3.2 percent in 2015. However, growth to be recuperating to 3.4 percent in 2017. Based on quarterly economic performance reviews, global economic performance has been slackening successively since the beginning of the year. This fading trend is mainly the result of a slowing down in emerging and developing economies, particularly in West Africa. Advanced economies performed better in the first and second quarters of the year, even though they too are now portraying signs of fatigue. The main factors responsible for this subdued performance in 2016, rebalancing in Nigeria and adjustment of commodity exporters to protracted decline in the terms of trade due to persistent low commodity prices. Other factors have also contributed to the global economic downturn, including low world trade, low inflation in advanced economies, or non-economic factors such as geopolitical conflicts (Omo-ogbebor, Dennis, Ahmed Sanusi, 2017).

This growth prospect differs considerably across countries and regions, with emerging Africa, particularly Nigeria, achieving a robust growth, while Sub-Sahara Africa undergoes a harsh slowdown. Generally, downward

revision was made to the growth forecast for the commodity exporters, in the midst of serious domestic uncertainties and a more challenging external environment. The ECOWAS Commission launched the development of a strategy for the Sahel region based on the decision of the Authority of Heads of State and Government held in Abuja, Nigeria on 17 and 18 July 2014. The ECOWAS Sahel Strategy aims at providing a regional response to the long-term development and stability challenges of Sahel-Saharan areas. In the period under review, the Commission consolidated its cooperation with other partners of the Sahel Strategy in the region, particularly Nigeria and G5 of the Sahel, Sahel Mission of the African Union. The Commission is expected to hold political dialogue with Mauritania and Chad to strengthen cooperation with G5 Sahel. In order to make platform for the coordination of the ECOWAS Sahel Strategy operational, leaders for the infrastructure, resilience and security, education, advocacy and monitoring and evaluation activity groups have been selected (Olayiwola, Osabuohien, Okodua and Ola-David 2015).

A series of technical meetings were held in Nigeria on the European Union fiduciary fund for the Sahel. These meetings presented the activity areas of the fiduciary fund and the Commission was able to submit project sheets to the European Union on projects in the agriculture and food security areas. Consultations were held in Abuja on 20 October between the Commission and the UN Office for Africa and the Sahel during which the two institutions discussed the action plan for the ECOWAS Sahel Strategy. Furthermore, the EU Delegation in Abuja and ECOWAS Commission held a number of technical meetings with the representatives of the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria in April and October 2016. The meetings involved discussions on the impact of the WA-EU EPA market access offer on certain production sectors in Nigeria and the possibility of amending the agreement offered for consideration during the regional EPA policy review mechanism every five years. Further discussions were also held in collaboration with the European Commission for the organization of a regional workshop for the private sector and civil society in West Africa in the last two quarters of 2016 (Nwokoye, Uzodigwe, & Nzeribe, 2018).

West Africa met in 2016 to examine the draft rules of procedure of the joint EPA organs. The two sides agreed to continue discussions to finalize these rules. Furthermore, the ECOWAS and UEMOA Commissions continued working on the establishment of a regional consultation mechanism to ensure the appropriate participation of the region, including the non-State actors, in the joint bodies of the Implementation of Development Programme ECOWAS Commission agreed to commence the implementation of the EPADP prior to

the entry into force of the EPA. The earlier implementation of the EPADP aims at preparing West African States to improve the competitiveness of their economies. In this regard, the EPA Regional Preparatory Task Force meeting was held in 2016 with the participation of the EU member States and European Investment Bank. The meeting considered the concrete modalities of the contribution of these actors to the implementation. Furthermore, the implementation process of some projects started, under the National Indicative Programmes of the 11th, particularly in the areas of support for agriculture, energy and civil society. The identification of related projects also continued in 2016 under the Regional Indicative Programme of the 11th, particularly for tax reforms, infrastructure and strengthening private sector competitiveness. The EU and West Africa continued working towards a common methodology to evaluate the fulfilment of the EU commitment in the amount of 6.5 billion euros for the implementation of the EPADP (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa & World Trade Organization 2017).

Challenges Nigerian to ECOWAS

The Nigerian economy is reverse substantial challenges. While the non-oil sector accounts for 90 percent of GDP, the oil sector plays a central role in the economy. Lower oil prices have significantly affected the fiscal and peripheral accounts, decimating government revenues to impartial 7.8 percent of GDP and resulting in the doubling of the general government deficit to around 3.7 percent of GDP in 2015. Exchange restrictions introduced by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to protect reserves have impacted significantly on segments of the private sector that depend on an adequate supply of foreign currencies. Coupled with fuel shortages in the first half of the year and lower investor confidence, growth slowed sharply from 6.3 percent in 2014 to an estimated 2.7 percent in 2015. The authorities formally announced the economy falling into a recession in the second half of 2016. Recovery in economic activity is expected to be modest in the medium term given the uncertain global outlook and the likelihood of oil prices remaining low. The authorities have recognized the need for significant macroeconomic adjustment to move and put the economy back on track. This entails, among others, implementation of a coherent package of policies to safeguard fiscal sustainability and reduce external imbalances as well as advancing structural reforms to support inclusive growth (Saygili Peters & KnebeL2018).

The Economic Community of West African States, as you know, is an economically integrated community. It aims to promote cooperation and integration with a view to creating an economic union, to improve its

populations' livelihoods, to promote growth, and contribute to the growth of the African continent. When, in 1975, this organisation's founding fathers met, they naturally had unity and development in mind. This is why the Treaty of 1975 does not mention political issues, issues of security and peace. The founding fathers thought that the only communal desire to create an economic community would be enough to erase the ghosts of all the disagreements between countries. But very quickly, in 1978, three years later, they had to do otherwise because inter-State conflicts had begun to develop between some States. This is why, during the same year, they adopted the non-aggression Protocol and a little later, in 1995, the Mutual Assistance as regards defence (Abia2006).

Significant activities implemented included the collaboration with various development partners and attendance at several international and regional fora to assess the security environment in the region including the adoption of the 6-point roadmap to resolve the Guinea-Bissau crisis and setting up of the International Support Group for the Consolidation of Democracy and Economic Recovery in Burkina Faso. Sensitization workshops on awareness creation on the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, were organised for civil society organisations and relevant regional stakeholders to facilitate its effective implementation in the Member States (Olayiwola, Osabuohien, Okodua and Ola-David 2015).

Early Warning and Response Mechanism In order to enhance ECOWAS Member States' capabilities to engage in the prevention, management and resolution of local and national low intensity conflicts, the Commission, through National Early Warning and Response Mechanisms (NEWRM), continued to undertake activities for the effective and efficient deployment of the NEWRM through a participatory approach involving key stakeholders in the Member States. **Mediation and Facilitation**, the Commission implemented several initiatives that helped mitigate political tensions, and strengthened knowledge management and mediation capacity in the region. These, among others, include supporting the efforts of the ECOWAS Special Envoy for Guinea Bissau and the ECOWAS Mediator in facilitating political dialogue involving stakeholders in Guinea Bissau. Main activities implemented included the establishment of a civil society Organisation Platform to institutionalize CSO involvement in the promotion of Accountability and Transparency evaluation of the report on the human rights situations and the rule of law in the ECOWAS region, and the organisation of a meeting to promote media involvement in participatory governance (Yoroms 2010).

Achievements recorded by the during the review period included the execution and evaluation of Amani Africa II Field Training Exercises; completion of Western Accord 2016 Planning Life Cycle; and participation in several training courses including courses in the counter-terrorism and peace. The Commission also continued with the implementation of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials continued both at regional and national levels based on the 5 year priority plan, 2010 – 2015. Sustained efforts were also made to address the lingering outstanding financial obligations owed to the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB) and the Africa-Led International Support Mission in Mali (Omo-ogbebor Dennis, Sanusi, 2017).

The ECOWAS Commission continued measures aimed not only at ensuring ownership of regional programmers by Member States but also strengthening coordination in resource mobilisation for the implementation of the regional agenda in compliance with international commitments. In the area of development cooperation, the Commission signed Memoranda of Understanding with the Islamic Development Bank and the African Petroleum Producers' Association (APPA). Other Memoranda are being finalised in particular with the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (Mevel, and Karingi, 2012).

The Commission focused its efforts primarily on the finalisation of the Community Strategic Framework 2016 – 2020 through a participatory process involving Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Professional bodies and National Planning Experts in Members States to ensure the alignment of the CSF with the AU Agenda 2063 and National Development Strategies of Member States. In line with its mandate to ensure probity and accountability in the implementation of all regional integration programmes and projects, the Commission finalised the Draft Result Framework for the Community Strategic Framework (CSF), 2016 -2020, and prepared various management reports namely, the 2015 Annual Programme Performance Report, 2016 Quarterly Performance Reports and 2016 Community Performance Report (Omo-ogbebor, Dennis, Sanusi, 2017).

Linkage theory

Linkage theory is used in this study. The exponents of linkage theory include Nixon and Kissinger (1970), Rosenau (1990), Northage (1998), Lisca (1992) among others. Linkage theory assumes that there is a linkage between the foreign relations of a country and the domestic and international environments. Realists emphasize on the normal channels of inter-state

relations. This involves informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal bureaucratic arrangements. But there are other multiple channels that connect societies as well: informal ties among Non-governmental elites and those developed through Trans National Organizations such as corporations. The linkage theory takes care of this, and the former. The usage of this theory is not new. This is not only because of its significance but also because of the relative ease and comprehensiveness with which it approaches the question of what determines relations among nations. Their background, beliefs and predispositions have important bearings upon foreign policy and the behavior of nations.

The main focus of this chapter is the theory of issue linkage in international agreements. The central question I will focus on is: What are the benefits and costs of issue linkage for the various countries involved? The ultimate objective is to gain a better understanding of the patterns of issue linkage that we observe across different policy areas and across international institutions. It is important to define what I mean by "issue linkage". This is an umbrella notion that includes several types of linkage, as will be clear in a moment, but when I say that issue areas A and B are linked, I mean that international agreements in policy areas A and B are connected at some level. More concretely, I will consider three types of linkage:

Examples of issue linkage in real-world international agreements are not hard to find. In this section I will mention some examples of linkages between trade and non-trade issues, and discuss some empirical regularities suggested by casual observations. Before proceeding, however, it is important to note that identifying issue linkage empirically is not always straightforward.

First, there may be issue linkage even if this is not made explicit in a written agreement, for two reasons: Sometimes issue linkage is informal, rather than being formally incorporated in written agreements. For example, trade sanctions are often used in response to violations of security agreements, even though this kind of punishment is not specified explicitly in the agreements. Think about the trade sanctions imposed by various countries on Russia for the annexation of Crimea: the Helsinki Accords of 1975 that Russia violated do not mention explicitly the use of trade sanctions. If there is issue linkage at the level of negotiations, this need not produce an integrated agreement.

For example, suppose a trade agreement and a security agreement are the result of linkage in negotiations, whereby governments exchange concessions across the two issue areas: still, the two contracts may be separate, and there may be no formal interaction between the trade policy commitments

and the security commitments. Moreover, the reverse observation also applies: if an agreement mentions policies in different issue areas, this does not mean necessarily that there is issue linkage. Suppose for example that governments sign a trade agreement but do not cooperate on environmental policy; if there are structural interactions between trade and the environment it may be a good idea to make trade policy commitments contingent on environmental circumstances, but this does not mean that there is issue linkage.

While identifying linkage empirically may be difficult, there are many examples suggesting that linkages between trade and non-trade policies do occur in reality. In what follows I list some of these examples. Examples of linkage between trade and human-rights agreements are surprisingly many. Following are a few, borrowed from Charnovitz (1998) and Hafner (2005): the 1825 Amity, Commerce and Navigation Treaty between UK and Argentina provided that Argentina suppress slave trade; the 1894 Commerce and Navigation Treaty between UK and Japan required each country to grant the other country's citizens freedom of worship; the Commercial Agreement of 1921 between the Czech Republic and Austria required that each country assure that workers from the other country would enjoy equivalent treatment with respect to worker rights; the ITO Charter of 1948 contained several provisions about non-trade issues, including on worker rights and on cooperation with the IMF (although of course the ITO never saw the light of day).

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa COMESA Treaty articulates the “recognition, promotion and protection of human and people's rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The Lomé Agreement and its successor, the Cotonou agreement (which are preferential trade agreements between Europe and a number of ex-colonies) commit member countries “to promote and protect all fundamental freedoms and human rights, be they civil and political, or economic, social and cultural”. Beyond the specific examples above, Hafner (2005) shows that, as of 2002, about 70 preferential trade agreements contain human-rights clauses of some kind.

Examples of linkage between trade and environmental policies are relatively rare: The Free Trade and Economic Integration treaty between Guatemala and Honduras of 1956 directed both governments to “co-ordinate their activities with a view to protecting forest reserves and water resources and preventing forest fires and soil erosion in the frontier regions of their respective territories. The International Whaling Commission (1978) directs member countries to prevent the export of ships and gear used for whaling to non-

signatory countries e.g. Japan; the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the encourage members to restrict imports of products with adverse effects on the ozone layer from non members Baldwin (1995).

Dependency Theory

Dependency theory is a mixture of various theories, including world systems theory, historical structure theory, and neo-Marxist theory. Collectively, these theories contrast modernization theory, an earlier theory of state development that ceded much of its explanatory ground during the 1960s and even the 1970s following U.S. interventionist challenges overseas, as well as problems associated with race relations, economic inflation, and the decline of the U.S. dollar.

Dependency theory can be seen as a critique based on the following question or problem: Why do some countries become rich while others remain poor? This question is posed against the previously held conception that economic development was beneficial to every country within the international system. Economic prosperity in particular countries, however, often resulted in deep problems in terms of underdevelopment. Dependency theory holds expected outcomes for peripheral countries: Economically, the outcome of development is continued underdevelopment; socially, the outcome is inequality and conflict; and politically, the outcome is the reinforcement of authoritarian government.

The years that followed the end of the Second World War in 1945 saw swift and extensive processes of decolonization. Thus, the roots of dependency theory can be found among the years when capitalist countries began to develop, the United States and the Soviet Union acted as leaders in a new and neo colonialist orientation of the international system, and both sought to expand their influence (neo colonialism for the United States and socialism for the Soviet Union) over nascent political and economic actors throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Not all countries within the periphery were willing to follow the U.S. model. Many sought to avoid U.S. influence and pursue the socialist model;

However, others did not easily accept the development strategies of the Soviet Union. Rather, some decided to pursue non aligned methods of development with the assistance of the United Nations and other international organizations. By contrast, modernization theory considers nature, economic situations, world market integration, and technological development or transfers of technology between developed countries and underdeveloped countries. The deficiency in this theory derives from its internal examination of

development among underdeveloped countries. It assumes that such countries are underdeveloped simply because they are still at a very early stage of their own development, and to advance, they need to look at developed, particularly Western countries. Western countries can be seen as archetypes, offering specific patterns or standards that countries can follow to achieve modernity. Dependency theory casts aside the suppositions offered by modernization theory that each and every country within the international system should pursue a predetermined path in order to become advanced and prosperous Loewenberg (2010).

Competing Perspectives

A great deal of debate within the literature on dependency theory leads to numerous and often competing perspectives and discourse. Dependency theory is, on one hand, about the relationship between developed and underdeveloped countries. On the other hand, the relationship is about countries that have emerged and those that are emerging. Alternatively, dependency theory describes the world in terms of a capitalist or imperialist core also known as the wealthy states and an exploited (also exploitative) periphery. The subjective nature of debates found within dependency theory means there are many different and often productive ways of examining the world. These different points of views can lead to intensive but informative debates.

Countries at the core of the international system are referred to as the “haves,” whereas those found within the periphery are called the “have-nots.” Industries, government, social elites, financial power, and systems of education are key characteristics of the core countries. By contrast, periphery countries possess mining, forestry, agriculture, less power, poor systems of education, and low wages that are incapable of sustaining affluent lifestyles. These factors are central components composing the relationship between the core and the periphery.

Dependency theorists also describe the interaction of more than just the core and periphery. They argue that states perform different functions within the world economy, which are divided into four groups instead of two: center of the center, periphery of the center, center of the periphery, and periphery of the periphery. For example, consists of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Includes advanced and industrialized countries, such as Canada, Japan, Italy, and Spain. Countries within this group have less global power and wealth than the countries. There are also countries, such as South Africa, India, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia. These countries have a reasonable amount of wealth

despite the fact that they are still undergoing processes of development. Countries are the poorest countries of the world and are the least advanced; They include the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Zimbabwe, and Burundi, among many others. The CC and the countries are the haves, whereas and countries are the have-nots.

There are a number of key assumptions regarding this relationship. Underdevelopment is not a phenomenon directly related to the internal conditions of a country, as peripheral countries are actually dominated by the foreign interests originating within core countries. Although underdevelopment can be overcome, to do so, countries need to be disconnected from the dominance of core countries and the system or structure that their interests and policies produce.

Limitations

The propositions of dependency theory are not without limitations. Although the theory has served various disciplines in the analysis and explanation of the persistent poverty of underdeveloped countries, the theory significantly failed to explain the rise of the newly industrialized countries of East Asia Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, as well as those of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand). The theory also presumes that all developing countries share the same traits. In addition, dependency theory is limited in its analytical ability when applied to sectors beyond manufacturing. Moreover, changes in India's economy after that country shifted to an open market system presented further challenges to dependency theorists.

There are fewer supporters of dependency theory today than there were decades ago. Some believe dependency theory to be a less relevant conceptualization of the arrangement of wealth, whereas others claim that dependency theory is still applicable to the study of state impoverishment and the world system in the 21st century.

Research Methodology

Research Design: The study adopted qualitative method focusing on the interpretative research to analyze Nigerian Approach on Socio Political Economic Development Contribute to West African state the research used key, Based on random sampling was used to gather data from the ministry of foreign affairs and embassy office in Nigeria, the questionnaire is considered.

Method of Data Collection: The study adopted focus group discussion with members of the ministry of foreign affairs and embassy staff as

the basic method used in data collection. The study used purposive sampling technique to select research participants in equal representation of male and female, amount the staff form the focus group discussion.

Method of Data Analysis: The study adopted explanatory analysis by transcription of the oral interview data obtained from the focus group discussion into text.

Result and Discussions: The result of this study revealed that in order to Nigerian approach on socio political economic development contribute to West African state, Nigeria as a hegemon in ECOWAS has played the role of regional stabilizer based on its leadership ability in enforcing ECOWAS programs and policies while remains state or Nations is a shining light in ECOWAS due to its steady democratic process which started from 1966 election, Nigerian government contribution to the development African state particularly emphasized of west Africa through economic community of west African state, ECOWAS. In the area of economic, security, politics and training retraining for the development of West African state.

Conclusion

The study deduced that the Nigerian government has tried to fully implement Nigerian Approach on Socio Political Economic Development Contribute to West African state in all segment of human activities on socio political economic development of West African state, Nigeria as a hegemony in the Africa continent has play the major role toward the development of the region at large.

Recommendations

Based on the findings, the study recommended that:

- i. Nigerian government should formulate a foreign policy that enhances the both human and food security measures to recover economic development to ECOWAS member states to establish modern agricultural programmes such as the irrigation farming.
- ii. Nigerian government should encourage corporative organisation private sector on Bilateral Agreement to open their businesses in ECOWAS member states so as to create jobs to the West African youth and women.
- iii. Nigerian government should collaborate with Non-governmental

organisation on Bilateral Agreement provide skill acquisition training to the West African youth to enhance self-employment in the region

- iv. Nigerian government should provide Bilateral Agreement free education for the tertiary institution to the West African youth.

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